Guest post: Talk on Public Law Litigation In India by Dr Surya Deva

Talha Abdul Rahman, a recent graduate of Nalsar University of Law, Hyderabad, currently pursuing post graduate studies (BCL) at the University of Oxford as a Shell Centenary Chevening Scholar, reports on Dr. Surya Deva's talk in Oxford on Public Interest Litigation in India. The presentation slides for the talk are available here. This blog has discussed the issue of PILs here, here and here. Talha's previous guest post on this blog can be found here.

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Civil Procedure Seminar Series for BCL/MJur students had first of its seminar today on “Public Law Litigation in India” by Dr Surya Deva, Assistant Professor, City University of Hong Kong. The primary audience of the seminar was students of Principles of Civil Procedure course lead by Prof. Adrian Zuckerman, but was attended by other students and fellows of University of Oxford. The seminar was partly based on Dr. Deva’s article titled “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review”.

The seminar began with the introduction of ‘public interest litigation’ (PIL) by outlining the factors that promoted its use as tool to do justice and that enhanced its popularity, and legitimacy of the system. He pointed out that its popularity is linked to the fact that it made justice accessible to poor Indians (while maintaining the impoverishment must not be construed only in economic terms), and made collective/diffused rights enforceable. It unfettered justice from procedural rules that proved as obstacles to access justice.

The second part of the seminar was focussed on tracing the evolution of PIL. The pioneers he pointed out, influenced by American jurisprudence, were Justice Bhagwati and Justice Krishna Iyer. He also summarily pointed out the distinction between public interest litigation and social action litigation as argued by Prof. Upendra Baxi. The former is ‘group’ based, and the latter is issue based (where focus is on getting the justice done) and thus the latter is actually the true nomenclature for PIL in India. He also made a brief reference to Prof. Julius Stone’s work in connection with using the law for social action. He further argued that as opposed to other jurisdictions, PIL in India finds itself deeply entrenched in the Constitutional provisions, and is therefore there to remain. Overall framework of the Constitution of India is conducive to development and invocation of PIL jurisdiction. He noted that the Supreme Court made suitable modifications to the scope and requirements under procedural rules relating to locus standi, filing procedures, cause of action, evidentiary problems and reliefs.

Curiously enough, through a graphic representation he pointed out how the Supreme Court over the years has changed the nature of PIL, and is increasingly addressing issues that concern middle-class Indian such as good governance, and dam construction. This, he juxtaposed with ‘First-phase’ of PIL in 1970s-80s where the Supreme Court was concerned with issues that were close to ‘poor Indians’. He also made a passing reference to “1949 Constitution” which had a provision, about which many do not know, that permitted enforcement of fundamental rights against private actors.

While these observations do have some force, it seems to me that it has been assumed that good-governance etc are issues that relate to middle class and have no relevance for poor Indians. It needs much more analysis. Further, the notion of ‘middle-class’ as being an identifiable class, distinct from ‘poor Indians’ is not entirely free from problems, especially when “poor” has to be construed also in non-economic terms. It is also arguable that rather than replacing issues that it dealt with, the Supreme Court began to expand it jurisdiction to take on board issues which were hitherto addressed with a hands-off policy. Also in attributing ‘class’ to exercise of jurisdiction over issues, one is obliterating the distinction that Dr. Baxi pointed out about Indian PIL – that it is issue based litigation.

He took the audience through a range of issues that the higher courts in India have dealt with under their PIL jurisdiction. Strong issues such as sexual harassment figured, but examples were dominated by rather risible selection of cases, such as PIL on “monkey menace”. It remained unclear that whether such examples were the rule or exception; as that would determine what role Indian courts have assigned to themselves, especially when audience is placed as an outsider in an international class-room setting. It could build a strong case for law reform by anecdote, against which an Australian academic (Prof. Camille Cameron) had cautioned in one of the earlier lectures in Civil Procedure in relation of class-actions.

He submitted that Indian Supreme Court is world’s most active court, may be rivaled only by Israeli Supreme Court, as it has deployed legitimate tools available to judiciary to claim powers that did not belong to it. He exemplified this by reference to judicial appointments, and development of ‘basic structure’.

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Dr. Deva pointed out that there has been much good that has been done by the public interest litigation, which he sees as a phenomenon. It revived the lost faith in the judiciary and thus its legitimacy. It was now increasingly to respond to systemic failures, such as lack of education, access to health, education etc. (Though no reference was made to Emergency, but I must take this opportunity to point out that some commentators see rapid development of PIL in India as judiciary’s ‘catharsis’ for its role during emergency). He pointed out that it created an additional forum where the government could be held accountable. In many a cases (environmental law for instance) it triggered legislative machinery to produce law, and did gap filling where required. At this point, a passing reference was made to separation of power. He further said that PIL in India had a “second tier” influence on legal development in the sub-continent, in that, courts of other countries did take note of these decisions by the Indian Supreme Court. This was followed by examples of cases, about which I have mentioned earlier.

As to the Dark Side of the PIL jurisdiction, firstly, he argued that it was capable of, and was in fact being abused. It was being used for surrogate purposes of advancing private or publicity interest using court resources. At this point, he expressed his concerns for excessive liberalisation of locus standi rules and definition of public interest. He also pointed out that PIL was being used to bypass normal route in litigation. (This to me from civil procedure perspective might run foul of ‘abuse of process’ doctrine, where emphasis is not on whether someone fits in text of the law but test is rather the purpose for which it is being used. There could be sanctions/costs implication under the English Civil Procedure.) He agreed that while Indian courts have begun to impose fine, parties generally bear their own costs.

Secondly, that it created an imbalance in allocation of resources. This is a serious concern in any legal system as there are limited resources that have to be used effectively, efficiently and fairly.

Thirdly, judges, he argued, could be motivated by desire of ‘judicial populism’ and to project themselves as crusaders of democracy. While this may have some force, but it must be pointed out that examples given earlier did not engage one in ‘judicial process’, which to me is an inseparable aspect of understanding why court behaved in the way it did.

Fourthly, that the court actually delegitimizes itself by engaging in ‘symbolic justice’ and giving rulings that cannot be enforced. (No distinction however was drawn between ‘progressive realization’ through creeping jurisdiction, and practically unenforceable rulings).

He concluded that there is an urgent need to develop rules to regulate public interest litigation, for it to be utilized effectively and efficiently. Prof. Zuckerman pointed out that we have reached an interesting situation wherein, we had begun to provide direct access to justice with minimum rules as obstacles, and now we want rules to ensure that justice is done. Without rules there is no justice.

This was followed by question and answer session.

In response to a question concerning certain ‘unenforceable directions’, he pointed out that there are no rules for what can be ordered by the Supreme Court as it has power to give ‘appropriate’ relief to do ‘complete justice’, phrases that the courts borrowed from the Constitution. He also pointed out that directions could be unenforceable despite the fact in a collaborative. non-adversarial PIL mechanism government is given full opportunity to place its case. It could be because of resource allocation, or sheer feasibility issues of law enforcement. He pointed out that there are no rules, except expectation that government would behave as model litigant and would not raise mere technical issues to defeat the ends of justice. He cited instances where government was castigated for such a behaviour. He pointed out that the judges have a ‘self-interest’ in not having black-letter rules of law as that would limit their judicial freedom. (At the same time he pointed out that courts in India have interpreted “shall” used in civil procedure to fix time-table of litigation as “may”, giving them power to extend time even when they could not do so under strict reading of the text.) From a civil procedure perspective, this to me, would undermine not only the authority the Parliament that has fixed time-tables to file pleadings, but would also cast doubts on the administration of justice is it issues ‘empty threats’. This is the sort of situation that imposition of sanctions for breach of peremptory orders under civil procedure and Rule 3.9 (Relief from Sanctions) of English CPR aims to address.

He further elaborated on court’s power and discussed its power to take action suo motu, with some reference to principle of Nemo iudex in sua causa (no one should be judge in his own cause). In response to a suggestion from a Dutch student to accommodate “ideological foundation” test to liberalize locus standi rules, he argued for a regime that provided economic disincentive. He pointed out that in 1996 there was a legislative attempt to impose fine for filing frivolous petitions, but it fizzled out in political cloud. In the same breath, he noted that the Supreme Court and High Courts impose fines in appropriate cases which are deposited in court’s treasury – probably recognizing frivolous petitions as injury to administration of justice and causing waste of court’s resources. There is, he pointed out, no costs regime that takes care of such issues. He believes that rules will have to be put in place, and it will have to be seen whether such rules come from courts under its delegated legislative powers, or from the Parliament.

In response to a question of whether the system has been exploited to impose moral policing or as social ordering of female sexuality, he noted that generally this jurisdiction was used to benefit women. Rather vague as it sounds, but the question is such that it calls for much deeper analysis than, I think, is possible in a seminar. He exemplified using sexual harassment cases, and noted that the trend also indicates inclusion of enforcement of rights against private actors using state machinery as surrogate device.

As an Indian student to me, it outlined in simple terms for international students, the broad contours of public interest litigation in India.

(I am thankful to Mr. Tarunabh Khaitan for giving me an opportunity to blog this seminar. I have tried to summarize the seminar on the basis of my notes, and references to Civil Procedure unless specified otherwise are my own observations. Faults, are all my own.)

A critique of tabloidization of law: A Guest Post

We are pleased to publish this guest post written by Pratiksha Baxi, Assistant Professor, Centre for Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.


While Professor Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s article has attracted immense discussion, the disturbing issue is not so much that it generated an intense debate about whether he offers an affirmation of Narendra Modi and his fascist government. Nor do we need to labour the fact that Professor Mehta’s legendary broad shoulders enable a critical engagement with his views, unlike other contexts where academics take critique personally especially where academic hierarchies mime judicial hierarchies. Rather there is something extremely provocative in the discussion Professor Mehta’s piece generated which I wish to gesture towards.


First, it is interesting to me that we continue to believe that court reporters are “credible” and therefore, when any one of us makes an honest mistake in believing a journalistic report, we are rightly dismayed beyond words. The genre of court reporting however is important as an object of research precisely because the court reporter records courtroom speech which often does not translate into the legal text. This process of translating at times produces, circulates and displays a ‘tabloid’ picture of law as versus jurisprudential pictures of law framed by “rule of law and cause of truth”. It blurs the distinction between fact and propaganda. Hence, this case acquired a value since it presented an opportunity to convert a specific template about the “fraud” of the activist [used by the Gujarat government counsel] to the universal yet spicy “Truth” about the suffering of Gujarat 2002. Dhananjay Mahapatra’s stories in the Times of India about the SIT Report are an example of the established genre of tabloidization of law. And our writing is already framed by a certain kind of complicity in the tabloidization of law, certainly to the extent we must refer back to the terms of discourse the tabloidization of law forces us to engage with.

Second, the secret document [SIT Report] offered was an irresistible resource to enacting a public dénouement, which could be certified as the Truth in the shadow of the courtroom. Hence, not only was Teesta Setalavad [and all NGOs] guilty of cooking up macabre tales of violence, but Mr Mahapatra also claimed that the SIT report has denied the exterminating sexual and reproductive violence on Kausar Bano among other cases of mass crimes documented extensively by activists. To my mind it is not so important to point out the obvious that the SIT report, a police investigation report, which will lead to several charge sheets, is not the Truth about the event which is yet to be adjudicated in the designated fast track courts in Gujarat. Rather, what is important to ask is why would people believe that the accounts of sexual and reproductive violence which found extensive documentation are an outcome of a pornographic politics of activist [read: feminist] fraud? There is enough writing on how the suppression of the testimonies of sexual and reproductive violence on women’s bodies is manufactured through the very process of state law whereby the riot machinery erases evidence of gendered violence. This has been the biggest obstacle to prosecuting such crimes in Independent India.

We must ask ourselves whether the tabloidization of law rests on extinguishing women’s voices, by making a spectacle of our bodies, and treating our suffering as a myth?

Third, what is it about the Best Bakery trial that haunts every discussion on Gujarat? What does it symbolize? Indeed, how does Teesta Setalavad, the person as versus Teesta Setalavad, the icon interpellate different discourses within “legal struggles” that work towards the “cause of justice” in Gujarat? The answers are too complicated to explore here; however one clear anxiety among academics and activists is how to resist the iconisation of survivors or those who represent them? These questions were especially pertinent since there was no witness protection program available to the survivors: indeed Teesta’s role in proffering a space to Zahira Sheikh was made vulnerable in the first place due to the structural failures of the legal system.

When we gathered support for our petition to the President to release Zahira Sheikh during unjust incarceration for contempt for one year the question that was raised was: what kind of responsibility do activists bear towards traumatised survivors who cannot carry the unbearable burden of courage imposed on them? The critique was directed at those who believed that Zahira Sheikh was lamentably seen as a “bad victim” who deserved severe punishment. This included the media, the court, activists and academics. We were worried about how Zahira Sheikh’s voice was extinguished in different ways.

Is the onus then not upon us to develop a nuance of how the iconisation of victims or those who represent them serves the tabloidization of law? While we need to have a vibrant discussion on the ethics of activists and academics, it will be a sad day if this is framed through the terms of reference of tabloidization of law, thereby forcing us to inhabit inane positions such as pro-Teesta and anti-Gujarat/anti-national; or anti-Teesta and pro-Gujarat/Modi.

Quattrocchi, the CBI, and the Attorney General

The CBI's recent decision to remove Ottavio Quattrocchi from its list of wanted persons has invited much debate on the CBI's impartiality, and the role of the Attorney General who allegedly asked the CBI to withdraw the red corner notice against Q. In yesterday's Indian Express, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, noted legal scholar, wrote an article presenting an overview of the role of an attorney general and highlighting the importance of the position.

Relations between Dr. Ambedkar and the Congress -- The Constituent Assembly and Beyond

Yesterday, at an election rally in New Delhi, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati accused the Congress party of mistreating Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and ensuring his defeat in the first general elections. A similar allegation was made by BJP President L.K. Advani a few weeks ago. I have not been able to find the full text of Mayawati's speech. However, the "salient points" of Advani's speech have been posted on the BJP President's website. According to Advani:

The Congress party never gave Dr. Ambedkar his due. It defeated him in the first Lok Sabha elections in 1952. A new book by Dr. H.V. Hande, a senior leader of the BJP in Tamil Nadu (Ambedkar & The Making of the Indian Constitution, published by Macmillan) throws light on how Dr. Ambedkar could not find a place among the 296 members initially sent to the Constituent Assembly. A Dalit leader from East Bengal withdrew himself, paving the way for Dr. Ambedkar to enter the Constituent Assembly as a member in his own right. Again, it was Mahatma Gandhi who prevailed upon Jawaharlal Nehru to include Dr. Ambedkar in his Cabinet.

The Congress party promptly hit back at Advani's speech. Home Minister P. Chidambaram accused the BJP of displaying newly minted affection for Ambedkar and referred in particular to Arun Shourie's controversial book, Worshipping False Gods, that was highly critical of the Dalit leader. Without wading into the political dimensions of this debate on Indian history, it would be useful to dispassionately analyze Mayawati's and Advani's contentions based on historical facts that are in the public domain.

Advani basically makes three points: (1) Ambedkar was unable to make it to the Constituent Assembly and someone had to withdraw for him to become a member; (2) it was Mahatma Gandhi who made Nehru inducted Ambedkar into his interim cabinet; (3) the Congress ensured Ambedkar's defeat in the 1952 General Election as there was no love lost between the party and the Dalit leader. Mayawati appears to reprise the first and third point. On the first point, she goes a bit further than Advani in specifically charging the Congress with blocking Ambedkar's entry into the Constituent Assembly, the entity which drafted and adopted our Constitution.

To fully appreciate Advani and Mayawati's complaint about Ambedkar 's membership of the Constituent Assembly, one must understand how that body was constituted. As a consequence of the Cabinet Mission's ill-fated attempt to broker a deal between the Congress and Muslim League, elections were held in July 1946 to the provincial legislatures of British India. These legislatures then elected 296 members to the Constituent Assembly (allocated roughly in the ratio of one to one million). The remaining seats in the Assembly were to be filled by representatives from princely states. Ambedkar was among the 296 members originally elected to the Assembly in 1946 from the provinces. B. Shiva Rao's first volume on the Framing of our Constitution has the original list of these 296 members. Dr. Ambedkar's name is listed as a representative of Bengal.

Ambedkar was the sole representative in the Constituent Assembly of the Scheduled Castes Federation. The Federation won 14 out of the 148 reserved seats in the 1946 provincial elections. Its poor performance was due to several reasons including high property qualifications for voter registration that disenfranchised most Dalits; the Congress party's superior electoral mechanism and zeal to ensure its candidates were elected from reserved constituencies; the joint electorate system after the Ambedkar-Gandhi Poona Pact; and the fact that many Dalit leaders had already joined the Congress.

In the Constituent Assembly, Ambedkar joined 29 other Dalit members many of whom elected under Congress tickets. Most of the Congress Dalits were associated with the All India Depressed Classes League led by Jagjivan Ram. Ambedkar was elected by the undivided Bengal legislature with five transferable votes (a minimum of four was required). The Scheduled Castes Federation did not have five members in the Bengal legislature. Therefore, it has been speculated that the votes for Ambedkar came from Anglo-Indian members, independent members who were Dalits, and possibly even the Muslim League.

Ambedkar was forced to seek election from Bengal, a province he did not have much connection with, because he lacked the requisite support in his home province of Bombay. Throughout the 1940s, Ambedkar and the Congress clashed bitterly over the issue of Scheduled Caste rights and representation. Ambedkar was an unyeilding critic of the party's positions on many issues, which he believed were enimical to the Scheduled Castes' interests. Therefore, Patel personally directed the Bombay Congress to select strong Dalit candidates who could defeat Dr. Ambedkar's nominees. Despite this political enimity, once in the Constituent Assembly, Ambedkar worked closely with his Congress colleagues in formulating and drafting our national charter. His cooperation and professional approach to the task led many Congressmen to soften their opposition to him, with some believing that he had acceptably moderated his previously radical positions.

This thaw between the Congress and Ambedkar stood the latter in good stead. Under the partition plan, Ambedkar lost his Assembly seat because Bengal was divided and fresh elections for the Constituent Assembly were to be held in West Bengal. When it became apparent that Ambedkar could no longer continue in the Assembly, the Congress high command decided that he was too valuable to lose. M.R. Jayakar, a jurist from Bombay, had resigned from the Assembly, and his place was to have been filled by G.V. Mavlankar. The plan was for Mavlankar to preside over the Constituent Assembly when it functioned as the central legislature for the Indian dominion from 15 August 1947 (Rajendra Prasad was in the cabinet and could not preside over the legislature). But the Congress party decided it would rather have Ambedkar fill Jayakar's place to ensure his continuance in the Assembly.

To that end, on June 30, 1947, Rajendra Prasad wrote to B.G. Kher, the prime minister of Bombay, directing him to have Ambedkar elected to the Assembly on a Congress ticket. Prasad explained that it was important to ensure that Ambedkar continued in the Assembly:

Apart from any other consideration we have found Dr. Ambedkar's work both in the Constituent Assembly and the various committees to which he was appointed to he of such an order as to require that we should not he deprived of his services. As you know, he was elected from Bengal and after the division of the Province he has ceased to be a member of the Constituent Assembly. I am anxious that he should attend the next session of the Constituent Assembly commencing from the 14th July and it is therefore necessary that he should be elected immediately.

Besides Prasad, Sardar Patel was also closely involved in the effort to ensure that Ambedkar remained in the Assembly. On the same day as Prasad wrote to Kher, Patel spoke to the Bombay Premier, who was not the greatest fan of Ambedkar, and urged Kher to take prompt action to ensure Ambedkar's election to the Assembly. The next day, Patel tried to pacify Mavlankar by explaining that Dr. Ambedkar's election required "earlier action" since there was only one vacancy available. Patel told Mavlankar that "all people here feel that [Ambedkar's] attitude has changed and he has been a useful Member in the Committee." He advised Mavlankar that "there [was] no hurry" about his election and promised that the Congress would arrange for his election through another vacancy that would occur after a short time. Patel reiterated this position in a letter on 3 July 1947 to Mavlankar in which he noted that "everybody wants [Ambedkar] now." The rapprochement between the Congress and Ambedkar was complete when Ambedkar returned to the Assembly in July 1947 greeted by loud cheers.

The best evidence in support of Advani's second point about Ambedkar being admitted into the interim cabinet due to Gandhi's urgings is Shourie's book. In it, Shourie quotes Jagjivan Ram's widow who claims that Ambedkar requested Jagjivan Ram to lobby Gandhi for a cabinet berth. Interestingly, in Ambedkar and Untouchability, Christoph Jaffrelot also seems to agree with Shourie on this issue, although much of Jaffrelot's book is devoted to rebutting Shourie's criticism of Ambedkar. Quoting his own sources, Jaffrelot states that Gandhi was behind Ambedkar's admission into the cabinet and specifically notes that Nehru was not particularly inclined to Ambedkar.

But the idea that it was Gandhi who was instrumental in ensuring Ambedkar's entry into the Cabinet is not universally shared. Mountbatten who gave Nehru plenty of unsolicited advice about whom to include and exclude (Mountbatten wanted neither Rajaji nor Prasad) seemed pleasantly surprised at Ambedkar's inclusion. But he does not reveal who sponsored Ambedkar for a cabinet position. Valerian Rodriguez in his very useful compilation of Ambedkar's writings argues that purported intervention of Gandhi on Ambedkar's behalf is yet to be fully corroborated. And an early Ambedkar biographer, Dhananjay Keer believes that Ambedkar was included in the cabinet through the collective efforts of Sardar Patel, S. K. Patil, Acharya Donde, and Nehru. Gandhi only granted formal approval for this plan when it was presented to him by Nehru.

Advani's third accusation (repeated by Mayawati) is facially correct. A Congress candidate did defeat Ambedkar in the 1952 election for the Bombay North Lok Sabha seat. However, it is important to note that the victorious candidate, N.S. Kajrolkar, was a Dalit as well and the constituency was a reserved one. Ambedkar faced the electorate just after he resigned from the Union Cabinet because of differences over the Hindu Code Bill.

While Ambedkar was still in government, the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee actually considered entering into an electoral alliance with Ambedkar's Scheduled Castes Federation. In fact, according to the veteran Congress leader S.K. Patil, the party kept a seat vacant for Ambedkar until the last moment. However, all bets were off after Ambedkar's party entered into an alliance with the Socialist Party. Oddly enough, Kajrolkar later confided to President Rajendra Prasad that Ambedkar lost the election because he did not get the Socialists' support. Ambedkar was subsequently elected to the Rajya Sabha in 1952. But he was defeated in his second attempt to enter the Lok Sabha through a 1954 by-election from Bhandara constituency. Ambedkar took this defeat in his stride. In fact, he learnt about it while on a visit to Rangoon.

Dr.Binayak Sen's bail:Latest from Supreme Court

The Supreme Court Bench (Coram: Justice D.K.Jain and Justice Sudarshan Reddy)heard Dr.Binayak Sen's bail plea today, after admitting his SLP. Justice Jain asked Ram Jethmalani, Sen's counsel, as to whether there has been any change in the circumstances since the last decision of the Supreme Court rejecting his plea. Ram Jethmalani replied that the whole case has been demolished, and the last witness has testified. He is not likely to abscond, Jethmalani told the Bench. "All material witnesses have been examined" he told the Bench. Thereupon, the Bench issued notice to the Chhattisgarh Government to file its reply within two weeks. When Jethmalani was concerned about the impending summer vacation further delaying his release on bail, the Bench appears to have told that the case could be heard by the vacation bench. Jethmalani again requested the Bench to let him have his heart examined by the doctors whom he trusts at the CMC, Vellore, as he put it, after all, in matters of heart, the patient should trust the doctor. But the Bench did not relent, and asked the State of Chhattisgarh to provide him the best possible medical care for his heart ailment. The Bench should have known why Dr.Sen distrusts the State Government's medical assistance. Read this appeal from his wife, Ilina Sen. Read and follow this site, for further information on the Court proceedings today.

Making Sure Prosecutors Act as a Check on Government

In this recent piece in the Indian Express I argue that India needs more strong and independent prosecutors to help address the continuing governance gap. I wrote the piece for a couple reasons. First, I feel that the government's prosecution apparatus is under-studied and theorized. Whether it's the CBI, the AGs office, or the state pollution control boards not enough is known about what drives prosecution decisions, nor is there sufficient public scrutiny in this regard. Second, prosecutors could act as an important check on government agencies, but all too often do not. This is a missed opportunity in the quest to make sure that law is properly implemented against citizens and the government.

One of the statistics that peaked my interest in this topic, but I did not have space to include in the article I came across when doing research on the state pollution control boards. If you do a Manupatra search you will get 12 cases in the Supreme Court in which a state pollution control board was a primary party. If you type in MC Mehta you get 119. Now this statistic may be misleading for a number of reasons - state pollution control boards were probably a secondary party in a number of other cases, many of the cases go through the appellate authority and so never enter the normal legal system, etc. Still, it brings home that these boards (like most prosecution agencies in India) aren't exactly pushing the law forward.

Contempt case against Gujarat Chief Minister

The Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, has another hurdle to face (in terms of ethics and propriety), before and if at all his party gets the mandate to project him as the next-to-next PM-in-waiting. The contempt petititon filed against him by Prashant Bhushan is to be heard by the Supreme Court next week. In this news analysis in Business Line, I answer the critics who call the Supreme Court's directive to SIT to probe the allegations against Modi ill-timed, and I also quote Prashant Bhushan. Meanwhile, we wish the Supreme Court's attempt to extend fast track justice to the carnage victims all success.